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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE LITTLE CORPORATION




John Winthrop called some of the very first Americans to live as "a
city shining on a hill." When we think of Americans who have risen up to
that calling, Wall Street is probably not the first image to come to mind. In
fact, there are many hard feelings toward the corporate echelon and its
apparently insatiable greed. And now, our very own government would be
the Robin Hood who plucks from the excessive bounty of today's CEO's
and their corporations to provide for the common worker through the pas-
sage of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"). But have they taken too much?
One corporation argues just that, that its religious rights have been in-
fringed upon by the ACA. Until recently, the Federal circuit courts were
split over whether for-profit corporations have the right to exercise relig-
ion. Naysayers claimed that an entity designed for making money cannot
possibly be religious, while the yea-sayers found no problem conceptualiz-
ing a person or group exercising religion after donning a corporate form for
their business. This Note provides an in-depth look at the case granting
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. the right to exercise religion, and why for-profit
corporations, under certain circumstances, should have their Free Exercise
rights formally recognized.
Part II will explain the history of Hobby Lobby and its owners as well
as how this novel issue was raised in response to the ACA. Part III will
examine the background and history of the law of religious freedoms and
protections in America, specifically the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). Part
IV will examine the legal theories that the majority based its decision
against the legal theories and reasoning proffered by concurring and dis-
senting judges. Part V will analyze the decision made in this case and
others similar to it. Part V will also discuss why the majority holding in this
case sets the law in America on its optimal path. Finally, Part VI will pro-
vide a brief conclusion.
* J.D. Candidate, Mississippi College School of Law, 2015.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Hobby Lobby, Its Owners, and Their Collective Beliefs
David and Barbara Green, with their three children, collectively own
and operate Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc.' The Greens have
organized these businesses explicitly around fundamental Christian beliefs
and practices.2 For example, Hobby Lobby's statement of purpose includes
"[h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a manner
consistent with Biblical principles."3 One way in which Hobby Lobby car-
ries out its stated purpose is to buy full-page newspaper ads that invite
people to "know Jesus as Lord and Savior."4 They also close all their
stores on Sundays.5 Hobby Lobby is also a large donor to six explicitly
Christian ministry outreach organizations.6
A part of the Greens' belief system, which is at the heart of this case, is
that life begins at conception.7 The Greens further believe that it would be
immoral for them to provide any means that will cause the death of a
human embryo.8
B. The ACA's Contraceptive Requirements and Exemptions
The conflict at issue arose for the Greens because their belief system is
in direct opposition to the contraceptive-coverage requirements of the
ACA.9 One provision in the ACA, the "contraceptive mandate," requires
employers such as Hobby Lobby, who provide health care to their employ-
ees, to include in their offered coverage plans certain contraceptives.'0 Of
the twenty approved contraceptives, four function by preventing the im-
plantation of a fertilized egg." The Greens objected to providing these
four abortifacient contraceptives.2
The ACA provides four exemptions to providing contraceptives to em-
ployees: (1) religious employers, (2) religious institutions of higher educa-
tion, (3) grandfathered plans, and (4) businesses with fewer than 50
employees.13 Hobby Lobby does not qualify for any of these exemptions.14
1. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013). Throughout this
Note, I will reference Hobby Lobby as the plaintiff and expound upon its specific situation as it was the
poster child of the case. There are two other business in the case as it appeared before the Supreme
Court: Mardel, Inc., and Conestoga Wood, Inc..
2. Id.
3. Statement of Purpose, Ho13Y Loimy, http://www.hobbylobby.com/our-Company/pur-
pose.cfm/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
4. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1122.
5. Store Details, Ho3BY Lomny, http://www.hobbylobby.com/StoreDetail/254 (last visited Feb.
22, 2015). Every store location has identical store hours.
6. Donations and Ministry Projects, Hosnv Losny, http://www.hobbylobby.com/our-company/
ministry.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
7. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1122.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1122-23.
10. Id. at 1123.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1123 n.3.
13. Id. at 1123-24.
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Hobby Lobby is not a religious employer like a church or synagogue.
Hobby Lobby is clearly not an institution of higher education. Hobby
Lobby's plan cannot be grandfathered because it has been amended within
the last few years. Finally, Hobby Lobby employs over 13,000 employees.
Therefore, Hobby Lobby falls squarely within the contemplated statutory
scheme requiring for-profit corporations to provide contraception to their
female employees.
C. Hobby Lobby's Quest for a New Exemption and
the Consequences of Failure
On September 12, 2012, Hobby Lobby filed a petition in the Western
District of Oklahoma.15 Hobby Lobby's challenge was based on the theo-
ries that it was protected by RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act.' 6 Hobby Lobby si-
multaneously moved for a preliminary injunction, which the district court
denied on the basis that Hobby Lobby had not demonstrated a likelihood
of success.17 Hobby Lobby then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which also
denied the preliminary injunction on a two-judge panel.18 Hobby Lobby
next sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court, which was also de-
nied.9 Desperately, Hobby Lobby moved for an initial en banc considera-
tion in the Tenth Circuit.2 ° The Tenth Circuit reversed on the issue of
likelihood to succeed giving Hobby Lobby the relief it had been persever-
ingly pursuing.21 Finally, the government appealed to the Supreme Court,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in favor of Hobby
Lobby.22
In this case, a five court majority gave four specific holdings: (1)
Hobby Lobby was a "person" under RFRA and was entitled to its protec-
tion; (2) Hobby Lobby was practicing religion; (3) the contraceptive man-
date substantially burdened its exercise of religion; and (4) the
governmental interest was not narrowly tailored.23
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
The question of whether a for-profit corporation has the freedom to
exercise religion is a question long put-off by American courts. There has
been no need to decide whether such a right exists for these corporations-
14. Id. at 1124.






21. Id. at 1147.
22. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
23. Id.
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until now. The ACA is a unique and highly controversial piece of legisla-
tion that presents never-before-seen problems to corporations. In this sec-
tion, I will specifically identify and describe the contraceptive mandate in
the ACA that is affecting corporate rights and how corporations and the
federal courts have responded to this mandate.
A. The Affordable Care Act and the Contraceptive Mandate
The ACA was passed in 2010 and took full effect in January 2014.24
The goal of this legislation is to provide health care to everyone in the
country.25 In order to help achieve this goal, Congress included a provision
requiring certain employers to offer health care plans to their employees.26
These health care plans must include certain contraceptive coverage, a pro-
vision commonly known as the "contraceptive mandate.'27 The contracep-
tive mandate requires employers to provide its female employees coverage
of "preventive care and screenings" without cost sharing.28 Included in the
preventive care are twenty FDA-approved contraceptive methods, four of
which operate by preventing a fertilized egg from implanting.29
One of the issues surrounding the contraceptive mandate comes from
business owners who object to providing contraceptives because of their
personal religious beliefs. Noncompliance is not really an option for these
business owners because the rod of ACA justice is quite severe.30 There
are two forms of noncompliance: a corporation would be noncompliant if it
provided health care coverage that did not meet ACA standards, and a
corporation would be noncompliant if it failed to provide health care cov-
erage altogether.31 If a corporation provides health care benefits that do
not meet ACA standards, the "tax" is $100 per day for each employee.32
Oddly enough, if that same corporation stops providing employee health
care insurance altogether, the punishment is less severe, but still crip-
pling.33 It requires a $2,500 fine per employee per year.34 The effect of
either choice is that no corporation can remain noncompliant with the
ACA and stay in business.
24. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1501(a), 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
25. Id. § 5001.
26. Id. §§ 1511-15.
27. 43 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012).
28. Id.
29. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013).
30. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4980D, 4980H (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1185d (2012).
31. See I.R.C. H 4980D, 4980H.
32. I.R.C. §4980D(b)(1). Hobby Lobby's tax would total about $475 million per year.
33. Id. § 4980H. This penalty would equate to approximately $26 million per year for Hobby
Lobby.
34. Id. § 4980H(b)(3)(A)(ii).
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There are four exceptions to the contraceptive mandate. Congress
recognized that this mandate runs counter to historical Catholic and Chris-
tian beliefs; thus, Congress carved out a few protections in anticipation of
that conflict.36 First, religious employers-such as churches-are exempt.37
Second, some nonprofit corporations-such as religious institutions of
higher learning-are exempt.38 Third, businesses that qualify can grandfa-
ther in their employee health insurance plans.39 Fourth, businesses with
fewer than fifty employees are exempt.4" But the question is: What hap-
pens when a corporation does not qualify for any of these four exceptions,
but its owners' religious beliefs are in direct opposition to the contraceptive
mandate? In an attempt to avoid choosing between closing their busi-
nesses and abandoning their religious beliefs, some owners have argued
that their for-profit corporations are entitled to religious protection under
RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.41
B. The Protection of Religion in America
From the very beginning of this country's foundation, woven into the
Constitution, the United States of America has stood proudly as a bastion
protecting the right to exercise religion as an individual and in coming to-
gether with like-minded individuals.42 As America grew and developed,
the approach to exercising religion progressed for many religious people
from the typical concept of church worship services to the field of creating
businesses that primarily help others.4 3 And so was born the non-profit
organization. These organizations are chartered to accomplish a particular,
and usually charitable, purpose.44 Congress granted these organizations
tax related benefits for the services they provide the community, so long as
the profits made by the organizations are used for continuing their laudable
goals and not for making the owners rich.45 Non-profit organizations were
35. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2013); Coverage
of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456,01 (Feb. 6, 2013) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54); 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2012); I.R.C. § 4980H.
36. See Jonathan T. Tan, Comment, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporations, and the
HHS Mandate: Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA's Requirements, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1301,
1304-05 (2013) (detailing the proposed legislation comment and revision process).
37. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1123-24.
38. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg.
8456,01 (Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a)(2).
40. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A).
41. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't. of Health and
Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114
(10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 678 (2013); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618
(6th Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.,
724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 678 (2013).
42. U.S. CONST. amend I.
43. Some common examples are hospitals, homeless shelters, soup kitchens, etc..
44. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015).
45. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109-1-1-1 CONo., DESCRIPTION OF EXEMPT ORGANI-
ZATIONS, (Comm. Print 2005).
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deliberately excluded from the ACA's contraceptive mandate.46 The wrin-
kle, and the issue at bar, comes when for-profit corporations claim they are
also pursuing laudable goals that deserve similar exclusionary treatment.
Until very recently, no court has ever needed to decide the issue of
whether a for-profit corporation can in any way be tied to the exercise of
religion. The ACA has done something new in the history of America,
though. It is not the first piece of legislation that forced reform on busi-
ness. For example, in 1938 Congress established the first national mini-
mum wage47 and in 1935 Congress established Social Security.48 But the
ACA is the first piece of legislation passed that requires businesses to do
something that runs afoul of some of the major religious tenets in the coun-
try. No business ever complained that providing a minimum wage some-
how violated a religious belief, but providing birth control, unlike paying
workers fair wages, is a hotly debated, morally-charged topic in modern-
day America. The arguments businesses made against Social Security and
minimum wage are fundamentally different from the argument being made
against the contraceptive mandate. The issue in the argument made was
whether Congress had the authority to regulate business so intimately. In
the latter, the question is whether Congress can burden religion when it
regulates business.
In this new arena created by the ACA, a for-profit corporation has
only one avenue that stands any chance of success in claiming sanctuary
from the contraceptive mandate: RFRA.49 A for-profit corporation must
meet several requirements in order to fall under RFRA's protection. First,
a court must find that the corporation is a "person" under RFRA.5 ° Sec-
ond, the corporation must show that the ACA places a substantial burden
on the corporation's exercise of religion.51 Finally, a court must be satisfied
that there are no compelling governmental interests that outweigh the cor-
poration's right to the exercise of that religion.52 None of these are small
tasks for a corporation, but the toughest, and the crux of this issue, is
whether a corporation should be considered a "person" who can exercise
religion.
46. Supra note 34.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 206.
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397mm.
49. Plaintiffs who argue that their Free Exercise rights have been infringed upon will usually do
so via RFRA because it is Congress's legislative overruling of Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res.
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) (hereinafter "Smith"). See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1133 (10th Cir. 2013) ("RFRA was Congress's attempt to legislatively overrule
[Smith] .... "). In Smith, the Supreme Court drastically changed Free Exercise law by holding that the
First Amendment does not prohibit the government from burdening religious practices through neutral,
generally applicable laws. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-881. In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected the
balancing test previously used. Id. at 883-84. If the law is neutral, Smith would have a court look no
further. Id.
50. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1128 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-(l)(a)).
51. Id. at 1137.
52. Id. at 1142-43.
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C. Corporate Personhood
RFRA provides that the "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion ... ,"I Congress did not define "person" in
this context, so courts have begun the guessing game of congressional in-
tent. In order to determine congressional intent, courts have looked in a
few places: (1) the Dictionary Act, (2) the context surrounding the RFRA,
and (3) the limited case law interpreting corporations' rights under the Free
Exercise Clause.54
The Dictionary Act is a statute containing the default definitions of
words commonly used in other statutes passed by Congress.55 It states:
"[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context
indicates otherwise.., the word 'person' ... include[s] corporations, com-
panies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock compa-
nies, as well as individuals. '5 6 If the Dictionary Act definition of "person"
applies, it is clear that corporations are to be considered persons. The bat-
tle here is whether the context surrounding RFRA indicates that Congress
intended to apply a definition other than the default definition it supplied
in the Dictionary Act.
Before the Supreme Court ruling, courts came down on both sides,
saying either that the context surrounding RFRA indicates corporations
are not persons or that nothing indicates otherwise.7 The first question is:
what counts as context to RFRA's use of the word "person"? One mean-
ingful source of context is the "the texts of other related congressional
Acts .... "58 Several similar religious protections are found in Title VII,
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the National Labor Re-
lations Act ("NLRA"). All were enacted before RFRA, and Congress
provided exemptions for each to "religious corporations.' 59 The fact that
Congress did not make specific carve-outs in RFRA, but provided protec-
tion generally for all "persons," then, is significant. Either Congress used
the word "person" as "extreme shorthand for something like 'natural per-
son' or 'religious organization,"' or these other Acts show that Congress is
fully capable of making narrow exemptions, but chose not to in RFRA.6 °
Another "source" of context surrounding RFRA is more of an ab-
sence of a source.6" In other words, there are no cases or statutes that
directly support recognizing for-profit corporations' right to exercise relig-
ion.62 Because there is no precedent on point, some would reason that it is
53. 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1 (a) (emphasis added).
54. See Hobby Lobby Stores. Inc., 723 F.3d at 1129, 1131, 1133.
55. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. The 7th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits have held that for-profit corporations are "persons" under
RFRA, while the 3d and 6th Circuits have held that for-profit corporations are not "persons" under
RFRA. See supra note 41.
58. Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 12113(d)(1)-(2).
60. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1130 (10th Cir. 2013).
61. Id. at 1166-70 (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1168.
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better to refrain from judicially creating this right.63 The absence of rele-
vant context indicates that when Congress used the word "person" in
RFRA, it could not have meant to extend religious protections to corpora-
tions because no one has ever considered corporations to have religious
rights before now.6 4 This is not an accurate depiction of the law, however.
The Supreme Court left open for future exploration the question of
whether for-profit activity might qualify as religious activity.65 Lower
courts, therefore, should have at least addressed the issue rather than skirt-
ing it solely because it had not yet been decided.
Lastly, a court may draw on related case law to support the notion that
the law has been heading in this direction for some time.66 For instance,
corporations were granted the freedom of politically-expressive speech in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.67 In that case, the Su-
preme Court overturned a line of cases holding that Congress had the au-
thority to prohibit corporations from using corporate funds for "speech
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.' 68 By holding
that a corporation had a protected right to take political action, the Su-
preme Court took a huge step toward protecting corporate civil liberties.
Although not identical, it is not difficult to see the parallel some courts
draw: protecting political acts seems similar to protecting religious acts.69
At the very least, the Supreme Court has made known its dedication to
defend the integrity of the First Amendment.
Along similar lines, some courts note that it has been long-recognized
that associations such as churches and other religious non-profits, and not
just natural individuals, have the First Amendment right to exercise relig-
ion.70 For example, the Supreme Court recently held that a non-profit cor-
poration was entitled to protection under RFRA in Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal.7' In that case, an American sect of
Brazilian Christian Spiritualists were using hoasca-a plant containing the
controlled substance DMT-to make and drink a ritual tea.72 The govern-
ment argued that its interest in applying the Controlled Substances Act
universally is compelling enough to burden this act of religion.73 Nonethe-
less, the Supreme Court held that the non-profit corporation was entitled
63. Id. at 1170.
64. Id.
65. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 345 n.6 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating "[i]t is ... conceivable that some
for-profit activities could have a religious character ...."); Id. at 349 (O'Conner, J., concurring) (em-
phasizing that the question of whether for-profit activities can qualify as also being religious is a ques-
tion that "remains open").
66. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1131-32.
67. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
68. Id. at 318.
69. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1135.
70. Id. at 1133-34.
71. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
72. Id. at 423.
73. Id.
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to seek protection under the First Amendment."4 The fact that these sect
members had adopted a corporate form did not staunch the Supreme
Court's vigorous protection of First Amendment rights.75 The Supreme
Court has on several other occasions recognized Free Exercise rights in
corporate plaintiffs.76
D. Substantial Burden
If a court does decide that a for-profit corporation is a "person" pro-
tected under RFRA, the corporation must then prove that the ACA places
a substantial burden on the corporation's exercise of religion.77 A thresh-
old question of substantial burden in this context is the penalty.7" A mere
increased expense does not qualify.79 A corporation must be faced with a
Hobson's choice, a lose-lose that is really no choice at all.8 ° The govern-
ment did not even dispute that the penalty in the ACA is intended to do
just that: comply or go out of business.8
The pressing question in this case is whether the act of providing con-
troversial coverage is too attenuated or indirect to the claim of burdening
one's religion. 2 On the one hand, some courts held that a corporation's
right to exercise religion cannot be substantially burdened when the em-
ployee, a third party, decides whether to use the coverage to buy contra-
ceptives.8 3 Those courts focused on the fact that providing the health care
plan is not what actually leads to the use of contraceptives; it is the em-
ployee who elects to use or not use the contraceptives, not the corpora-
tion. 4 Thus, the corporation's belief prohibiting contraception is not
violated.
Other courts, including most recently the Supreme Court, disagreed,
relying on Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division.5 In that case, the plaintiff, a Jehovah's Witness, worked in a
foundry, but was transferred to a factory where weapons of war where as-
sembled.6 The plaintiff objected to the transfer because his religion did
74. Id. at 439.
75. See id. The opinion found support from eight of the nine justices. Justice Alito took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case.
76. See e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(holding that city ordinances violated the corporation's and its congregational members' free exercise
rights); Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983) (allowing two corporations that operated
schools but could not be characterized as "churches or other purely religious institutions" to assert free
exercise rights).
77. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1137-41.
78. See id. at 1141.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See supra notes 30-34.
82. See Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1137-40.
83. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 414 (E.D. Pa.
2013), affd sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
84. Id.
85. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
86. Id. at 709.
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not allow him to help create weapons due to the violence they can cause.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's beliefs allowed him to work in
the foundry, one step isolated from making weapons, but not in the actual
factory.8" The plaintiff "drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line
he drew was an unreasonable one."8 9 The Supreme Court went on to say
that "while the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free
exercise is nonetheless substantial."90 In applying this case to corporations
providing health care plans, the job of the court is to determine if the cor-
poration's religious beliefs are sincere.91 Whether they are seemingly rea-
sonable or attenuated is irrelevant.92
E. Compelling Interests
Finally, if a corporation proves that the ACA places a substantial bur-
den on its exercise of religion, the burden shifts to the Government o show
that there are compelling governmental interests that outweigh the corpo-
ration's right to exercise its religion.93 Under RFRA, these interests will be
subject to strict scrutiny and must utilize the least restrictive means of ad-
vancing these interests.94
The Government argued that it had two compelling interests: (1) pub-
lic health, especially for women and children; and (2) gender equality in the
workplace.95 While these interests are compelling generally, the Govern-
ment must show that they are so compelling as to preclude granting a spe-
cific exemption for one corporation.96 Neither of these interests are
compelling in light of the fact that the exemptions Congress explicitly pro-
vided already cause tens of millions of people to not receive contraceptive
benefits.97 The Supreme Court has stated that "a law cannot be regarded
as protecting an interest of the highest order when it leaves appreciable
damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited."98 No court that
reached this stage of the argument found that the Government met its bur-
den of showing a compelling interest.99
87. Id. at 710-11.
88. Id. at 715.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 718.
91. See id. at 726.
92. See id. at 715.
93. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1143.
94. Id.
95. Kathryn S. Benedict, When Might Does Not Create Religious Rights: For-Profit Corporations'
Employees and the Contraceptive Coverage Mandate, 26 CowuM. J. GI-NDI-1 & L. 58, 97 (2013).
96. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1143-44.
97. Id. at 1144.
98. Id.
99. Benedict, supra note 95, at 97.
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IV. INSTANT CASE
The Supreme Court held 5-4 in this case that a closely held, for-profit
corporation is a "person" entitled to protection under RFRA.1 °° In reach-
ing that conclusion, the majority, authored by Justice Alito, relied on the
broad protection offered by RFRA, the Dictionary Act, First Amendment
arguments, and some arguments of policy.10' Justice Kennedy wrote a brief
concurrence to emphasize that ruling for Hobby Lobby in this case was a
win-win because a mechanism already exists to provide women cost-free
access to contraceptives, even to those women who work for exempted
businesses.12 The principal dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg, argued:
(1) women's rights are generally more important than the exercise of relig-
ion; (2) this case doesn't meet the standards of Smith; (3) this right should
not be extended because that's the way it has always been; and (4) making
money is antipathetic to the exercise of religion.0 3 Finally, Justices Breyer
and Kagan wrote a one-paragraph dissent.
104
A. The Majority for Personhood
The majority held that a for-profit corporation is a "person" under
RFRA, but the Court's holding was deliberately authored narrowly.
10 5
The Court only held that a closely held corporation could exercise relig-
ion."0 6 It did not attempt to answer whether a publicly traded corporation
could exercise religion.0 7 The majority offered several arguments in sup-
port of its conclusion that a closely held, for-profit corporation is a "per-
son" under RFRA that can exercise religion.
First, it is helpful to understand the Court's starting point. One of the
major themes in the Court's opinion was to repeatedly reference the long-
standing, general policy which gives broad protection to the exercise of re-
ligion.10 8 Further, the Court pointed to RFRA's broad protection'0 9 and
100. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). The other three holdings of the
Court, that Hobby Lobby was exercising religion, that the contraceptive mandate was a substantial
burden to the exercise of that religion, and that the governmental interests were not narrowly tailored,
are important insofar as they relate to Hobby Lobby in particular. However, those holdings do not add
anything new to the legal analysis, and therefore will not be the focus of this Note. As the law in this
area develops, it may be of interest to report on how courts have gone about determining the second
issue-when is a corporation exercising religion? Though that question is simply beyond the scope of
this Note.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2785-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 2787-2807 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2807 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2785 (stating "the contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, vio-
lates RFRA") (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2774 (stating "[t]hese cases, however, do not involve publicly traded corporations, and
it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which [the government] refers will often assert
RFRA claims"). The Court explained why it considered publicly traded companies to be unlikely to
assert RFRA claims. Id. It reasoned that there is a high improbability that "unrelated shareholders-
including institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders-would agree to run a corporation
under the same religious beliefs .... Id.
108. See id. at 2769-72.
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the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000's
("RUILPA") even more broadening expansion of that protection.)° When
Congress passed RUILPA, it included a provision that amended RFRA."1
RUILPA broadened the definition of what it means to exercise religion
under RFRA. 1 2 The first RFRA definition of "exercise of religion" de-
fined it as "the exercise of religion under the First Amendment.""' 3 The
new definition added "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled
by, or central to, a system of religious belief.""' 4 Congress instructed that
this concept "be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exer-
cise .... ""i The majority took that principle to heart and gave great defer-
ence to the practice of religion, no matter the form in which it appeared.
Second, the Court held that the Dictionary Act definition of Con-
gress's use of the word "person" was intended to apply to RFRA's use of
the word "person."'16 The Court implied that it is not a novel or last-ditch
legal argument to look to the Dictionary Act to supply definitions."7 It is
not even novel to look there for the definition of the word "person."" 8
The Court stated that Congress knows how to indicate when it wants a
peculiar definition to apply."1 9 For example, Title VII expressly exempts
from its scheme nonprofit religious institutions, but not for-profit corpora-
tions.' 0 Congress made no such attempt to narrowly define the word "per-
son" in RFRA.'2 ' The Court emphasized that if the Dictionary Act should
apply, there ought not to be any twisting of its definition without clear di-
rection to do so: "[t]he term 'person' sometimes encompasses artificial per-
sons (as the Dictionary Act instructs), and it sometimes is limited to natural
persons. But no conceivable definition of the term includes natural persons
and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations.
122
Third, the Court held that the corporate form cannot, by itself, prevent
the exercise of religion.'23  It noted that for-profit corporations are
chartered for any legal purpose, not for the sole purpose of returning the
largest profit margin possible per quarter.1 24 The Court also took note that
109. Id. at 2767 (stating "RFRA was designed to provide very broad protection for religious
liberty").
110. Id. at 2761-62.
111. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4).
112. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2761-62.
113. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994).
114. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2762; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012).
115. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2762; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).
116. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2769.
117. See id. at 2768 (stating "we therefore look to the Dictionary Act, which we must consult")
(emphasis added).
118. See id. (quoting FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177,1182-83 (2011) (slip op., at 6)) ("We have
no doubt that 'person,' in a legal setting, often refers to artificial entities. The Dictionary Act makes
that clear.").
119. Id. at 2773-74.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2769.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2770-71.
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a corporation may have more than one legal purpose.125 A business may
make money, and it also may be charitable.126 By way of examples, the
Court pointed to two cases involving for-profit businesses that were also
exercising religion.127 The first was Braunfeld v. Brown;28 the second was
United States v. Lee.129 In both of these cases, the plaintiffs were found to
be exercising religion while operating a business, but both lost their cases
on the merits.
In Braunfeld, the City of Philadelphia passed a Sunday closing law to
which several Jewish merchants objected since their religious faith already
required them to close on Saturdays. The Court entertained their claim
and ruled against them on the merits. In Lee, an Amish employer objected
to paying Social Security tax for his employees because his faith required
other means of supporting the community. In this case too, the Court
found that the law burdened the plaintiff's religion, but ruled against him
on the merits. The point the Court made in this case was that exercising
religion in the for-profit business arena is not a new concept. It just so
happens that Hobby Lobby was the first business to assert these rights after
incorporating.
130
Finally, the Court spent a considerable amount of time addressing the
arguments of the dissent.'13  Particularly, the Court spent time on two is-
sues raised by the dissent: (1) the no-precedent argument; and (2) the curb-
ing of women's rights argument.'
32
1. The No-Precedent Argument
The dissent argued that cases brought under RFRA should be con-
strained to the case-law prior to the enactment of RFRA, none of which
specifically granted free-exercise rights to a for-profit corporation.133 The
Court stated, however, that in ruling on a RFRA claim, a court is not
bound solely to the body of pre-Smith case law.134 Congress has enacted
legislation that did bind courts to a particular set of case law;135 but in this
situation, it bound the courts only to the "exercise of religion under the
First Amendment.' 36 This means a RFRA claim is taken in the light of
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2767, 2769-70.
128. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion).
129. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
130. As will be discussed later in the Note, it is the second, a fact which the dissent plainly ignores.
131. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (addressing "the dissent" or
the "principal dissent" twenty-four times throughout the opinion).
132. See id. at 2772, 2760.
133. Id. at 2772.
134. Id. (stating "nothing in the text of RFRA... was meant to be tied to this Court's pre-Smith
interpretation of [the First] Amendment").
135. Id. (citing as an example the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
136. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994). As discussed earlier, RUILPA broadened this definition
of exercising religion, marking a clear departure from any strict reading of the pre-Smith case law.
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anything the First Amendment is or can be.13 7 If RFRA had "merely re-
stored this Court's pre-Smith decisions in ossified form," it would leave
resident non-citizens without protection of their religious exercises as well
because no case before RFRA addressed their rights in a First Amendment
context-a result surely unintended by the dissent.138
The Court then proceeded to find and discuss a pre-Smith case where
a for-profit corporation challenged a law on First Amendment religious
claims-Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc.139 Al-
though a plurality ruled against the corporation on the merits, none of the
justices questioned the corporation's standing to bring the claim, and sev-
eral of the justices implicitly recognized the corporation's standing and
would have held for the corporation."' In this manner did the Court ad-
dress and dispel the no-precedent argument.
2. The Curbing of Women's Rights Argument.
The Court banished any notion that it was upholding the right to exer-
cise religion at the expense of curbing women's rights.1 It pointed to a
solution already in place for female workers in businesses already excluded
from the contraceptive mandate.42 Through the agencies designated to fa-
cilitate its operation, the ACA developed a mechanism by which women
who work for companies that may opt out of the contraceptive coverage
requirements can still receive cost-free access to contraceptives.1 43 In those
instances, the insurer is required to pay for the contraceptive coverage.44
Those insurance companies will not experience any increased costs, accord-
ing to the agency that established this mechanism, because "costs of provid-
ing contraceptive coverage are balanced by cost savings from lower
pregnancy-related costs and from improvements in women's health.
1 45
Under this accommodation, women seeking contraceptive care will con-
tinue to face "minimal logistical and administrative obstacles.'1 46 The
137. The text of the statute states that it should be construed "in favor of a broad protection ... to
the maximum extent permitted by . . . the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2012).
138. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2773. It is doubtful that the dissenters would make the argument that
Congress has the power to fossilize a constitutional interpretation short of a constitutional amendment
if a politically liberal issue were on the line.
139. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (plurality opin-
ion). The dissent plainly ignores this case: "There is in [the pre-Smith] case law no support for the
notion that free exercise rights pertain to for-profit corporations." Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 (Gins-
burg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
140. Burwell, 134 S Ct. at 2772-73.
141. Id. at 2760 (declaring that "the effect of the.., accommodation on the women employed by
Hobby Lobby . . . would be precisely zero. Under that accommodation, these women would still be
entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing").
142. Id. at 2763, 2781-83.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at n.38 (citing 78 Fed. Reg. 39877).
146. Id. at 2782.
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Court stated that these obstacles are far less burdensome than if the corpo-
ration dropped its health care completely or closed shop altogether be-
cause of its religious principles.147
The Court ultimately identifies the dissent's underlying problem with
this case."' It is not that women are being shunted by another patriarchic
and domineering scheme; clearly they are not. The dissent's true issue here
is "its fundamental objection . . . to RFRA itself." '49 The dissent would
rather take up the banner of Smith and keep courts out of the business of
dealing with "the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemp-
tions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind."15 The
Court, though, stated that Congress, via the enactment of RFRA, made
these very determinations the obligation of the courts.51
B. Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy played the role of peacekeeper in this decision. He
wrote separately to emphasize the importance of both issues at stake. He
spent the first half of his concurrence speaking to the gravity of protecting
religious freedom in America.'52 Then he made sure to frame up exactly
the breadth of the Court's opinion as he saw it.' 53 He pointed out that a
key assumption the Court did not spend much time addressing is that the
interests the government asserted to justify the burden on religion were
legitimate and compelling interests.154 He simply clarified that these inter-
ests were not being carried out in the least restrictive way, identifying the
mechanism the government had already developed for already exempted
employers.155 In Kennedy's view, the interests in protecting the exercise of
religion in this case did not impinge on the interests of promoting equality
in the workplace: a win-win.
1 56
C. Ginsburg's Dissent
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg focuses her attacks on the Court to
four major categories: (1) women's rights generally deserve more protec-
tion than the exercise of religion; (2) this case does not meet the standards
of Smith; (3) free exercise rights in for-profit corporations should not be
recognized because that is the way it has always been; and (4) incorporat-
ing into a for-profit corporation cannot be reconciled with exercising relig-
ion.157 This section will look at her arguments one-by-one.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2784-85.
149. Id. at 2784.
150. Id. at 2784-85 (quoting Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
874 (1990)).
151. Id. at 2785.





157. Id. at 2787-2806 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
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First, Justice Ginsburg is known for relentlessly arguing for gender
equality in the law.'58 Her dissent in this case started from the viewpoint
that a ruling for Hobby Lobby puts a chink in the armor of women's rights.
Accordingly, she set the tone of her dissent with a quote from Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: "The ability of women
to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.1 59 She then
stated that Congress embodied these reproductive interests in the contra-
ceptive mandate of the ACA. 1 60 With the premise clearly laid out, she
went about bolstering it and arguing for its severe importance.6' When
referring to these reproductive interests, Justice Ginsburg said that they
"are concrete, specific, and demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evi-
dence."161 In comparison, her tone toward protecting religious rights was
skeptical.'63 After going through a list of cases involving free exercise
claims that she found distasteful, she stated: "Would RFRA require exemp-
tions in cases of this ilk?' 64 So the dissent started from the opposite view-
point of the majority. While the majority started with the premise that free
exercise rights are of the highest order, the dissent placed the protection of
free exercise rights somewhere down the line, at least lower than protecting
gender equality and reproductive interests.
Second, in stride with its starting viewpoint, the dissent preferred to
analyze this case through the more restrictive lens of Smith, asserting that
"any First Amendment Free Exercise Clause claim Hobby Lobby ... might
assert is foreclosed by this Court's decision in [Smith]."'1 65 Even when
viewing the case through the proper lens of RFRA, the dissent artfully
squished RFRA into a box that looked more like Smith. For instance, the
dissent stated that the Court was "misguided by its errant premise that
RFRA moved beyond the pre-Smith case law."' 66 The dissent criticized
the majority because the Court used RFRA for more than its original pur-
pose-restoring the balance of substantially burdened exercise of religion
versus compelling governmental interest-the balancing test previously re-
jected by Smith.'6 7 According to the dissent, RFRA cannot be used if any
new or modified interpretation of the constitution is involved.168
158. Maker's Profile: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, MAKERS, http://www.makers.com/ruth-bader-gins
burg (containing a video interview with Justice Ginsburg and an accompanying written overview of
Justice Ginsburg's biography).
159. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 856 (1992)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2799.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2804-05.
165. Id. at 2790.
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Third, just as the dissent argued that RFRA cannot be used in a fresh
interpretation of the constitution, the dissent further argued that a new and
more expansive interpretation of free exercise rights is unwise precisely be-
cause it is new.169 The dissent's statement here is illustrative: "The Court's
'special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,' however, is just
that. No such solicitude is traditional for commercial organizations. In-
deed, until today, religious exemptions had never been extended to any
entity operating in 'the commercial, profit-making world."" 7 This state-
ment concerning the Court's lack of historical concern for commercial enti-
ties provided the basis for the dissent's conclusion that certain exemptions
have never been and should not be granted to commercial entities.
Lastly, the dissent argued that a for-profit corporation is un-redeem-
ably polar in form and mission to exercising religion.171 In making this
argument, the dissent made a key assumption that "religious organizations
exist to serve a community of believers. For-profit corporations do not fit
that bill."' 172 Certainly, it is not impossible to form a corporation whose
business is to serve a community of similarly faithed people,73 but the as-
sumption the dissent makes exposes a fatal misunderstanding of many reli-
gions. Namely, that in-reach is only one mission of a religion. Outreach is
an equal function of religion, a function that a self-supporting corporation
may be uniquely fitted to do.
D. Breyer's and Kagan's Dissent
These two justices wrote to agree with Justice Ginsburg on the point
that Hobby Lobby's claim should fail on the merits.174 They would rather
have reserved judgment, however, on whether a for-profit corporation can
bring a claim under RFRA.
175
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, I suggest that it is right for corporations to be consid-
ered persons under RFRA so that a corporation may at least get its day in
court. Organizing into a for-profit corporation should not be a death sen-
tence to exercising religion. Rather, it should serve as one of the eviden-
tiary components in showing whether religious activity has taken place. In
reality, this recognition of Free Exercise rights would have a very narrow
application. Not many corporations could argue that they exercise religion
while keeping a straight face (at least not successfully), and not all of those
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2794-95 (citations omitted).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2796. This idea was central to the dissent's argument, and reiterated that "religious
organizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious faith. Not so of
for-profit corporations." Id. at 2795.
173. In fact, in this very case the Greens own a Christian bookstore chain, which arguably does
just that, serves a community of other Christians.
174. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2806 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
175. Id.
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that could will find occasion to assert that their right to exercise religion is
being infringed. But to those whose rights are at stake, it is of the utmost
importance to afford protection.
At its heart, this issue deals with a tension between two sets of rights.
It seemingly pits the exercise of religion against gender equality. Many of
those that oppose recognizing religious rights in for-profit corporations do
so for fear that this new legal argument represents an additional excuse to
burden women in the workplace. On the other hand, many of those that
would see these rights recognized are concerned that the trend in America
over the last several decades has been to corrode religious liberties. There
is no point in hiding the fact that these viewpoints are often couched in
terms of left- and right-wing dogma and slathered in mutual distrust and
cynicism. This section aspires to bridge the gap in our quickly polarizing
melting pot and show that these rights can coexist in harmony.
To be clear, I am not arguing that all corporations exercise religion. I
am also not suggesting that corporations are somehow underdogs in need
of champions who will wink at the inequities that tend to appear in the
wake of the concentrated power of the Fortune 500. Instead, I am arguing
that there are people who live and work in the secular business arena who
are themselves deeply religious. Some of these people start their own busi-
nesses, and many times for more reasons than to simply make a profit. It
would be a true injustice to deny them the right to exercise religion just
because they have ventured into a world dominated by a secular mindset.
In fact, it is precisely when religious rights are a minority that they need the
most protection.
The bulk of my argument will focus on the legal justifications for pro-
tecting the Free Exercise of religion under the above-mentioned circum-
stances. I will endeavor to show that the current law in America supports
the notion that the definition of "person" as it is used in RFRA should
include for-profit corporations. There are three main reasons why this is
the best interpretation: (1) the Dictionary Act's definition of "person" ac-
curately describes Congress's intent when it used the word "person" in
RFRA; (2) any argument that the corporate form or for-profit activity nec-
essarily precludes the exercise of religion suffers from a fatal flaw in logic;
and (3) any judicial fear of future litigation is unfounded. In addition, I will
argue that Hobby Lobby exercises religion and that it deserved to be ex-
empted from the contraceptive mandate.
A. How Can We Be Sure that Congress's Use of the Word "Person"
in RFRA Includes For-profit Corporations?
There are two main reasons why it is clear that the congressional in-
tent in RFRA was to include for-profit corporations: (1) Congress has nar-
rowly defined the word "person" in previous legislation, but it did not do
so in RFRA; and (2) the context surrounding RFRA does not indicate that
the Dictionary Act definition of "person" should not apply.
[VOL. 34:89
THE LITTLE CORPORATION THAT COULD
The first point is self-evident. Congress exempted "religious" corpora-
tions, associations, etc., from Title VII's prohibition on discrimination.
176
The term "religious corporation" shows that Congress knows exactly how
to exclude for-profit corporations from the protections of its legislation. It
defies common sense to posit that Congress meant to exclude for-profit
corporations in RFRA when it used the broad term "person" that typically
includes all types of business forms instead of a narrower term it has used
in the past. The general rule is that if Congress intends to exclude a partic-
ular class from its legislation, it will do so explicitly.'
77
The second reason the definition of the word "person" in RFRA
should include for-profit corporations is because the Dictionary Act should
apply. The Dictionary Act is a statute containing the default definitions of
words commonly used in other statutes passed by Congress.178 It states:
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context
indicates otherwise.., the word 'person' . . . include[s] corporations, com-
panies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock compa-
nies, as well as individuals."'179 If the Dictionary Act definition of "person"
applies, it is clear that corporations are to be considered persons. The bat-
tle here is whether the context surrounding RFRA indicates that Congress
intended some definition to apply other than the default definition they
supplied in the Dictionary Act.
The first place to look for context is the surrounding text of RFRA.1
8
1
The text of RFRA does not indicate any specific meaning. The text reads:
"Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of relig-
ion . . ,,1s' That sentence is as generic and broad as can be drafted, so it is
necessary to look for other context outside of the Act itself.
The extra-textual RFRA context centers around a separation-of-pow-
ers struggle between Congress and the Court. Immediately after the case
Employment Division v. Smith"8 2 was decided, Congress passed RFRA to
legislatively overrule it. This was done so that strict scrutiny would remain
the standard for resolving Free Exercise disputes. Therefore, the common
law context around RFRA is treated as practically identical to the common
law context surrounding the Free Exercise Clause. At this point, some
would argue that because no court has ever explicitly held that a for-profit
corporation was exercising religion, Congress could not have intended for
RFRA to cover for-profit corporations. That, however, is a hasty conclu-
sion not necessarily supported by the whole context of the Free Exercise
Clause case law. To begin, because no court has ever declared that the
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 12113(d)(1)-(2).
177. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871, 880 (10th Cir. 2000).
178. 1 U.S.C. § 1.
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
182. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (overruling previous precedent that allowed Free
Exercise claims regarding the oppressive consequences of neutral laws of general application).
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philosophical possibility of a for-profit corporation exercising religion ex-
ists does not suggest that Congress took notice of the lack of commentary
on the subject, inferred from that shortage that for-profit corporations
were therefore incapable of exercising religion, and incorporated that legal
theory into its drafting of RFRA by not even mentioning it. In other
words, it takes a great leap to jump from "there is a lack of perfectly on-
point context" to "Congress intended to close the book before the first
word was written in it." There is a first time for everything.
Moreover, the common law context is not quite as sparse as some
would make it out to be. Free Exercise rights have historically benefitted
from fierce protection by the courts, and some corporations have already
been granted Free Exercise rights.'83 Though these corporations have been
non-profit corporations, the question has never been addressed as to
whether the rights are to stop at for-profit corporations. The Supreme
Court specifically left open, for future exploration, the question of whether
for-profit activity might qualify as religious activity.18 4 Regardless, Con-
gress certainly made no effort to distinguish between for-profit and non-
profit corporations in RFRA. It stands to reason that if "person" already
refers to one type of corporation, there ought to be no problem for every
corporation to fall under the term "person" without any congressional indi-
cation to the contrary.
The Supreme Court seemed to implicitly acknowledge that there is no
distinction between for-profit and non-profit entities when it extended Free
Exercise rights in United States v. Lee'85 to individuals who own for-profit
businesses. In that case, the Amish individual was a farmer and a carpen-
ter-both of which were purely money-making business enterprises.186 He
hired several other people from his Amish community to work in his car-
pentry shop and on his farm.'87 He believed paying into Social Security on
behalf of his employees violated the religious principle of personally pro-
viding for neighbors.'88 The Supreme Court held that the Social Security
tax was indeed a burden on his religion, but that the governmental interest
in maintaining the Social Security program outweighed the individual's be-
lief that it was wrong to pay the taxes associated with his for-profit busi-
nesses.89 So even though the result was a suppression of religious exercise,
for-profit entities are in fact capable of religious exercise through their
owners.
183. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
184. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 345 n.6 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that "[i]t is... conceivable that some for-
profit activities could have a religious character"); Id. at 349 (O'Conner, J., concurring) (emphasizing
that the question of whether for-profit activities can qualify as also being religious is a question that
"remains open").
185. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
186. Id. at 255.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 257.
189. Id. at 259.
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This court-granted right to exercise religion is contingent on whether
the corporation can show that it was actually exercising religion, and it
would still be tempered by the government's opportunity to show that its
interests outweigh the individual's belief. In the case at hand, Hobby
Lobby stood to lose much more than the plaintiff in Lee,9 ' and as will be
discussed below, the governmental interests in this case fall short of the
burden required to justify restricting Hobby Lobby's religious faith.
B. Why is it Illogical to Assume that the Corporate Form or Profit-
making Activities are Bars to Exercising Religion?
The most obvious answer to this question is that some corporations are
already considered entities capable of exercising religion. Churches, edu-
cational institutions with religious affiliations, and other non-profit organi-
zations do already exercise religion even under their incorporated form.
The question, then, is not whether a board of directors can cause an entity
to exercise religion-the answer to that question is an unchallenged "yes."
The question is: are for-profit corporations of such a different nature that
they cannot exercise religion?
The best way to answer this question is to look at the differences be-
tween for-profit and non-profit corporations; there are generally three.9'
The first is the declared purpose for which the corporation is formed. The
second is that for-profits may do anything, including paying dividends to
shareholders, with the profits they make. Third, as a result of the first two
differences, non-profit corporations get a break on taxes while for-profit
corporations do not. As these three differences are discussed further, it
will become evident that they have more to do with taxes and less to do
with religion.
First, declaring the purpose for which a corporation is organized and
operated is only a tax-related requirement tangentially related to religion.
To qualify for non-profit status, one may incorporate for any number of
reasons, only one of which is for religious purposes.192 For example, a cor-
poration qualifies for non-profit status if it incorporates for "literary pur-
poses" or to "foster amateur sports competitions.,193 It stretches reason to
say that a non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of fostering
amateur sports competitions may exercise religion while a for-profit corpo-
ration that also exclusively fosters amateur sports competitions cannot ex-
ercise religion. This is just one example that exposes the fiction of a non-
profit/for-profit distinction in the realm of Free Exercise.
Second, the decision to pay money back to investors is not necessarily
related to the purpose of the organization. There is an assumption that the
only way to accomplish religious or charitable activity is through an entity
190. The taxes assessed in Lee totaled only $27,000, whereas Hobby Lobby would be forced out of
business by the ACA penalties.
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that receives donations instead of investments, but that assumption may
deserve some scrutiny. To be fair, the invention of non-profit organizations
by Congress was a good one. It provides an incentive for capable, inter-
ested, and dedicated citizens to supply worthy services to society so that the
government can focus its attentions and resources more freely. It should
be recognized, however, that it is not the only incentive to do good. There
were do-gooders before the non-profit tax-break, and there will be do-
gooders if it is repealed. It just might be too exclusive to label all for-profit
work uncharitable and unreligious.
Third, the main reason for a corporation to declare any specific and
limiting purpose is to qualify for the non-profit tax benefit. But it may be
easier to accomplish laudable goals without relying on the tax benefit. One
may reasonably conclude that it is preferable not to depend on donations
or worry over compliance with other non-profit regulations in the running
of a business. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that some, possibly
many, for-profit corporations have come into existence to do more than
simply make profits. One may start a business for many reasons. For in-
stance, one might want to offer a particular service to society, or to fulfill
personal dreams and passions. Why not also to further one's religion?
The decision to make profits under the traditional corporate scheme
or to be exempt from taxes may be wholly independent from the decision
to operate a corporation on certain religious principles, use profits to do
good deeds, or cause the corporation to exercise religion. Drawing a con-
stitutional line between for-profit and non-profit corporations, the defini-
tions of which are based on a tax code that has seen nearly annual changes
in the last decade, is at best imprudent and hasty.
C. Why is Fear of Future Litigation Unfounded?
Some detractors have voiced concern that if for-profit corporations are
explicitly given the constitutional right of Free Exercise, many corporations
will take advantage of that ruling. The fear is that there will be a flood of
filings attempting to exempt corporations from any number of onerous fi-
nancial burdens placed on them by the federal government. The problem
with this position is that it is closer to dicta designed to end the conversa-
tion rather than an actual concern. The reality is that if corporations are
recognized as exercising religion, it has limited applicability and is just as
easily monitored as individuals exercising religion.
First, there is a reason that no court has ever had to address whether
or not a for-profit corporation can exercise religion until very recently. The
reason is because the federal government has never passed legislation so
morally divided and so broadly sweeping as the ACA. It is not that lawyers
have become more clever in their representation of corporations trying to
save a buck here and there. Birth control that can cause abortion is a real
issue in the hearts of many who own businesses. Neither the federal gov-
ernment nor the courts are suggesting that this is a ploy to avoid a financial
burden. The truth of the claim is evident. No business could seriously
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complain that its religion demanded 20-hour workdays. The non-religious
nature of that claim is equally evident. There will not be a flood of filings
because there are not yet any other similar issues of debatable moral im-
port in regulatory corporate law. This is a novel circumstance with a rem-
edy that has very limited applicability.
The next concern is that even if the applicability is limited, it will be
difficult to discern which corporations sincerely hold the belief in question.
"Ah, yes," a devious corporation may say, "we believe this too. With all of
our corporate heart." But I am skeptical that the task of discerning a cor-
poration's sincerity of belief would be any more difficult than discerning
the sincerity of an individual's belief. After all, courts are already required
to inquire into the sincerity of an individual's belief. No one has cited the
difficulty in discerning individual sincerity as a reason for doing away with
individual religious liberty. That argument similarly fails with respect to
corporations.
After reviewing the law, it seems evident that the Free Exercise Clause
extends its protection to for-profit corporations by way of RFRA. One's
worldview, however, will certainly color each argument that has been made
thus far. So by way of reinforcing the position that the freedom of religion
ought to be protected with earnest vigor, I will briefly delve into a few
historical comments. The Supreme Court, in its mission to honor the vision
our Founders set forth for us in the Constitution, expressed its robust com-
mitment to fortify religious freedom in America: "The values protected by
the religious freedom clauses of the First Amendment 'have been zealously
protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly
high social importance.""94 The question may be fairly asked, why do we
value the protection of religious freedom so strongly? The Supreme Court
put it this way: "[T]he people of this nation have ordained in the light of
history, that ... these liberties [religious faith and political belief] are, in
the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the
part of the citizens of a democracy."'9 5 That Court would go on to say that
these fundamental liberties are a great roof under which a myriad of beliefs
and lifestyles could thrive.196
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has argued for the extension of the right to exercise religion
to for-profit corporations under RFRA and Free Exercise Clause. Both
the settled law and the underlying principles for protecting the right to ex-
ercising religion support extending these rights. Granting for-profit corpo-
rations the right to exercise religion does not, as some tend to argue,
necessarily infringe on any other rights. Extending these rights is the logi-
cal product flowing from the historically fierce protection of the right to the
194. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 402 (3d Cir.) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)).
195. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
196. Id.
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freedom of religion, including the right to incorporate and continue one's
practice of religion. Gender equality does not suffer a defeat at the hands
of this Supreme Court opinion. Rather than paint Hobby Lobby as a
"Prince John" greedily hoarding its wealth, those who fight for the rights of
minorities oppressed by their society should triumph in the reality that one
corporation, in the face of a greed-driven and avaricious economy, shines
like a city on a hill.
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